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INTRODUCTION 
 As we look cross-nationally at labour movement revitalization, we see a complex process of change that 
varies depending on the socio-political/economic context. Although we observe a diverse set of union strategies 
and outcomes, we find that structural adjustment is a common element of revitalization efforts. The mere 
presence of restructuring does not, of course, assure positive results. In this chapter we define various forms of 
restructuring, outline factors that shape and promote restructuring, and discuss the likelihood that restructuring 
leads to union revitalization by using examples from our cross-country comparison. 
Concrete cases of unions’ structural change take a variety of forms that fall into three predominant categories. 
The first is ‘external structure’ (Clegg 1976: 40) or ‘external shape’ (Hyman 1975: 3), which comprises the 
boundaries of a labour movement. As such, external shape embraces the principles that underpin the pattern of 
union organization, decisions on which workers, occupations, and industries to include or exclude, as well as 
border or demarcation lines between unions. In some cases there are notable modifications in the relationship 
between different levels of the labour movement. Specifically, this might involve redefinition of the role of the 
peak level vis-a-vis individual national unions. External restructuring may result from altered arrangements 
among unions at the same level, in most notable cases leading to mergers. A union may also unilaterally engage 
in external restructuring by redefining its own borders. This might involve creating a subsidiary, in essence, to 
enter a new industry, occupation, or geographic jurisdiction in order to extend ‘job territory’ (Undy et al. 1981: 
60). 
The other two categories of union restructuring are internal to the specific organization. One internal component 
is union governance, the analysis of which centres on union democracy, representation, and participation (Undy 
et al. 1981: 37; Weil 1997: 204). It is, thus, concerned with internal union politics and relations between different 
groups within a union. The governance process may be altered to increase the authority exercised by a national 
union over its locals as part of a programme to shift priorities. The other internal category is union 
administration, which focuses on union management and the allocation of resources. This aspect of restructuring 
within a labour organization might relate to specialization of certain functions, real- location of resources, or the 
reform of management systems (Clark and Gray 199T. 196; Weil 1997: 217-20). While the distinctions between 
the two internal aspects of structure are not clear-cut, they capture different elements of the revitalization of 
union organizational life. 
Whatever the form, restructuring neither automatically contributes to labour movement revitalization, nor 
necessarily increases a union’s power. In order to appreciate the potential for meaningful restructuring and the 
obstacles to progress via this route, it is necessary to map both the factors that influence success and the 
motivations for structural change. Once a framework has been established, we will review the experience with 
restructuring in the five countries and will highlight those efforts with some potential to promote revitalization. 
At the end of the chapter we will evaluate that experience in the context of the dimensions of revitalization 
introduced in Chapter 2. 
FACTORS THAT DRIVE RESTRUCTURING 
 As entrenched institutions, labour movements face major hurdles as they embrace new priorities and 
attempt to restructure to facilitate pursuit of these priorities. The more radical the change, the more substantial 
the obstacles are likely to be (Nord and Tucker 1986). As with other institutions, the most serious obstacles to 
union revitalization stem from internal resistance to change (Kotter 1995). Similar to other organizations, trade 
unions are subject to strong inertial pressures, which often allow for only a conservative transformation of their 
goals, structure and tactics (Selznick 1957; March and Simon 1993; Voss and Sherman 2000). There is inevitably 
a high degree of internal resistance faced by almost any kind of comprehensive restructuring. This may come 
from members comfortable with the status quo and concerned about being disenfranchised, from leaders 
worried about losing their political base, or from staff unsure where they will fit in the new organization (Fletcher 
and Hurd 2001). But what does it take to overcome this resistance? In Figure 7.1 we present a model that 
captures common elements of successful transformation in unions. This model is not intended as a definitive 
treatment of structural change, but rather as a simplification that will help highlight key aspects of the change 
process. 
There are two mutually supportive causal chains that are associated with successful union restructuring. In the 
countries we have studied, resistance to restructuring is neutralized where there is a sufficient level of 
environmental pressure to start the process. As shown in the upper section of Figure 7.1, such pressures can 
raise the level of urgency within the union. Environmental pressure alone may not be sufficient, however. 
Awareness can be facilitated by union leaders and staff who educate members about the existence and impact 
of the external pressures in order to win support for organizational change (Armenakis et al. 1993; Fletcher and 
Hurd 2001: 207). 
Environmental pressures, even when widely understood, will not directly produce comprehensive restructuring 
on their own, however. In addition unions need a clearly articulated conception of their future,
  
which might be formally codified as a mission (or vision) that provides a basis for strategic priorities. This is 
depicted in the lower part of Figure 7.1. If restructuring is not driven by mission, or at least by clearly articulated 
goals, initiatives almost inevitably will stop short of transformation because there is no focus and direction (Allaire 
and Firsirotu 1985). This is not to say that without a mission there would not be restructuring at all, but rather 
that such cases would result in a limited ‘structural fix’ (Grabelsky and Hurd 1994; Behrens 2002). 
But how are we to distinguish between structural change that is cosmetic, amounting to little more than a short-
term expedient glossing over fundamental weaknesses, and restructuring that has the potential to contribute 
substantially to labour movement revitalization? It is our collective qualitative judgement that the character of 
restructuring is linked to the motivations that initiate the change process. To help unravel the complexity of 
motivations for structural change, we adopt a framework that borrows heavily from the literature on union 
mergers. 
Table 7.1 summarizes different motivations that shape the three aspects of restructuring delineated above: 
internal changes in union government, internal administrative modification, and external restructuring. We posit 
that three alternative motivations can underpin union restructuring: aggressive, defensive, and transformative. 
The merger literature describes cases where a larger partner seeks to assimilate other unions with the primary 
intent of increasing the size of the individual union (Chitayat 1979: 129; Undy et al. 1981: 167). Among the 
intentions that might underpin such aggressive restructuring are the consolidation and strengthening of the 
political control of union leaders, and the extension of the boundaries of the individual union. If restructuring is 
merely aggressive, however, it is unlikely to translate into net membership growth for the labour movement as a 
whole, nor to any notable enhancement of union bargaining power or political influence. Union leaders might 
implement aggressive internal restructuring to increase their personal control of a union’s governance system 
and administrative apparatus (Chitayat 1979: 131). Alternatively, they might adopt a narrow interpretation of 
corporate models and attempt to increase personal power through aggressive external restructuring: for example, 
affiliating independent unions and adding units (Chaison 1996: 8), or possibly by reaching ‘sweetheart’ 
agreements with employers, thus adding members and dues revenue without providing representational services. 
 
Figure 7.1. Organizational change in unions 
  
In sum, if restructuring is merely aggressive, it is unlikely to translate into net membership growth for the labour 
movement as a whole, nor to any notable enhancement of union bargaining power or political influence. 
The most commonly mentioned motivation in the merger literature is survival (Waddington and Hoffman 
2000:73-4). Similarly, we label as defensive those restructuring initiatives that are reactions to declining fortunes 
and that attempt to stabilize the union. Although this may involve appropriate adaptation to economic change, if 
the restructuring is merely defensive it does not offer great potential to increase union power per se. Defensive 
restructuring may focus on internal procedures, attending to the short term interests of members and leaders in 
effect by retrenching and erecting barriers that attempt to limit the impact of external challenges and threats to 
the union’s established culture and practice. External defensive restructuring is not as insular, however, as it 
involves efforts to form alliances with other organizations that might help forestall decline. The aggressive and 
defensive forms of restructuring capture the vast majority of union mergers. A study of union mergers in five 
countries by Chaison concluded that ‘in each country, mergers were unable to resolve the fundamental problems 
that created them’ (Chaison 1996: 165). 
We turn to the organizational change literature for help in identifying restructuring with the potential to 
contribute to labour movement revitalization. The consistent message is that the more radical the change, the 
 more essential it is to approach the effort strategically based on careful assessment and thorough preparation 
(Allaire and Firsirotu 1985). To capture the strategic essence of this type of change, we label as transformative 
those restructuring efforts tied to substantive organizational change that promise to augment union power along 
at least one of the four dimensions identified in Chapter 2. In other words, we argue that transformative 
restructuring is likely to support union revitalization. 
Although such restructuring may include aggressive or defensive elements, these are pursued within the 
framework of the union’s strategic plan. In essence the portion of Table 7.1 devoted to transformative 
restructuring relates back to the type of organizational change depicted in Figure 7.1. Transformative motivations 
are different in substance from those associated with merely aggressive or merely defensive restructuring. 
Internal changes of union government and union administration are pursued not to protect the vested interests 
of leaders and current members, but rather to engage all of the union’s constituents and prospective constituents 
in the change process. The goal is to reform the union’s governance and administrative machinery in order to 
address new strategic priorities. Similarly, whether it involves redefinition of the role of the confederation, 
mergers of individual national unions, or the creation of new union ventures, external transformative 
restructuring is motivated by a desire to augment the union’s strategic effectiveness. 
Because transformative restructuring potentially can contribute to labour movement revitalization, the next 
section emphasizes those transformative initiatives that are being pursued by union organizations in the five 
countries. We do not attempt to review all restructuring nor even to delineate all cases of structural change. 
Rather, we summarize the most prominent forms of restructuring and pay special attention to those with the 
potential to contribute to revitalization. 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND UNION REVITALIZATION 
 Union restructuring can be implemented at any level of the labour movement, ranging from local unions 
to cross-national organizations. In order to review coherently the relevant range of structural change, it is 
necessary to clarify the terminology we will use. At the peak of union organization within each nation state are 
confederations to which national unions may affiliate. For our purposes, therefore, the American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) is a confederation, although it is often referred to as a 
federation within the United States, as is the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the German Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB). The Italian Federazione di Categoria (Industrial Federations) and the Spanish 
Federaciones Sindicales de Industria (Industrial Federations), the principal affiliates of the confederations in the 
two countries, are treated here as similar to the national unions of Britain, Germany and the United States. At the 
pan-European level we have cross-national organizations that are increasingly important in the context of 
economic integration associated with the European Union. There is the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) whose affiliated organizations include the European Industry Federations (EIFs), which are comprised of 
individual national trade unions from EU member countries.1 
 We will first look at restructuring within the five countries at the level of confederations, then look at structural 
change in national unions, and conclude with a review of developments at the pan-European level. Although we 
will highlight where possible transformative restructuring, we note in advance that much of the structural change 
within the five countries is defensive in character. Furthermore, even those structural initiatives with the potential 
to be transformative often have failed to realize this potential. This is particularly the case where membership 
decline and associated financial weakness, have prompted unions to react more defensively. Nonetheless, there 
are clear examples with the potential to aid labour movement revitalization in each of the five countries. 
Furthermore, the institutional change that has accompanied the European Union since 1990 has created an 
environment more conducive to substantive innovation. In consequence, pan-European trade union institutions 
exhibit a marked structural vitality. 
Peak Level: Confederations 
 The trajectory of recent developments in our five countries is affected by differences in the function and 
structure of confederations and by the influence they exercise over affiliated unions. In particular, Italian and 
Spanish confederations have a more wide-ranging bargaining function than their American, British, and German 
counterparts. To facilitate the undertaking of this wider bargaining function, Italian and Spanish confederations 
have greater authority over affiliated unions. By comparison American, British, and German national unions 
vigorously protect their autonomy from confederal interference. Furthermore, in Italy and Spain several 
confederations compete on the basis of different political allegiances,2 whereas elsewhere confederal structure 
is unitary.3 Italian and Spanish confederations collect union income and disperse it to affiliated organizations, 
whereas the reverse is the case in Britain, Germany, and the United States. This distinction further compounds 
the differences in the relationships between confederations and affiliated organizations. 
Irrespective of these differences, a consistent theme among the confederations of the five countries is the 
extension and reform of external shape. To expand the external boundaries in Britain, Germany, and the United 
States, confederations have encouraged new affiliations, particularly of unions that organize in the expanding 
sectors of the economy. Since 1995 the TUC has accepted fourteen additional unions into affiliation,4 while both 
the United American Nurses and the California School Employees recently affiliated to the AFL-CIO. Similarly, the 
DGB encouraged the involvement of the Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft (DAG) in the Vereinte 
Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft (ver.di) merger in 2001, thereby bringing the DAG within the scope of the DGB for 
the first time since 1945. In Italy and Spain the relative strength of the confederations allows them to have greater 
influence on the pattern of expansion. Since 1998, for example, the three major Italian confederations have each 
established unions specifically to organize and represent ‘parasubordinates’ or labour only sub-contractors (Fullin 
2002; Baccaro, Carrieri, and Damiano 2003: 45). 
The promotion of mergers is at the core of policy initiatives to reform external shape. Again, however, differences 
in the political position of the confederations influence the character of these initiatives. The AFF-CIO, DGB, and 
 TUC have no direct authority over the merger process. In consequence, while the merger process has reduced the 
number of affiliated unions, these confederations have had little influence over which unions are involved in 
specific mergers. For example, between 1990 and 2001 each experienced a decline in the number of affiliates 
largely as a result of mergers: AFF-CIO, from eighty-nine to sixty-six; DGB, from seventeen to eight; and TUC, from 
seventy-six to seventy-three.5 Because of the limited role of the confederation, there is no consistent principle of 
organization that influences merger choices, with the consequence that the merger process has not simplified’ 
trade union structure. In contrast, in Italy and Spain the confederations have been able to guide mergers between 
affiliated organizations. In Spain, this influence has been brought to bear to promote sectoral organization at the 
expense of regional structures (Hamann and Martinez Fucio 2003). 
One issue concerning external shape specific to Italy and Spain is the closer working or merging of confederations. 
Throughout the 1970s and until the mid-1980s the Italian confederations maintained a formal alliance 
administered through the Federazione Unitaria with representation from the three confederations. During this 
period the prospect of a confederal merger was raised, although the different political affiliations of the 
confederations constituted an insurmountable barrier (Kreile 1988; Focke and Baccaro 1996). The dissolution of 
many of the traditional party- confederation affiliations following Tangentopoli (corruption scandals) in 1992 
facilitated the development of the unity of action between the confederations and a formal proposal to merge in 
2000. Political differences re-emerged after 1998, however, once again putting the merger proposal on hold. 
Similarly, in Spain the unidad de accion (unity of action) between Union General de Trabajadores (UGT) and 
Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.) until 2001 represented a weakening of traditional political animosities. While the 
emergence of confederal mergers on the union agenda in Italy and Spain represents a marked shift in attitudes, 
with the occasional breakdown of these alliances in both countries it is clear that considerable barriers have yet 
to be overcome before they are realized and external shape is transformed. 
Most of the confederations in the five countries have introduced limited changes to systems of government. In 
particular, systems of reserved seats for women, white-collar, young, and ethnic minority workers are now 
commonplace (Braithwaite and Bryne n.d.; Garcia, Hacourt, and Lega n.d.). For the most part, representation 
within confederations remains dependent upon the membership size of the affiliated union, a system that has 
been in place for much of the twentieth century. It is only in Italy that transformative changes to systems of union 
government have been introduced, although even these changes had their origin in defensive counter- measures. 
Three developments promoted the shift in the systems of Italian confederal government. First, after the mid-
1970s many skilled workers left unions affiliated with the confederations after the reforms to the scala mobile, 
which narrowed wage differentials based on skill (Regini and Regalia 2000). Second, a large number of sindicati 
autonomi (autonomous unions) were established to represent the interest of white-collar workers, who regarded 
the confederations as focusing too strongly on the interests of manual workers. Third, Comitati di Base (COBAS, 
rank-and-file committees) were established, primarily in the public and service sectors, in opposition to the 
policies and practices of the three confederations. In combination, these developments constituted a crisis for- 
 confederal union organization in Italy (Kreile 1988; Bordogna 1989). In response, the confederations instigated a 
series of reforms including the practice of submitting all major collective agreements to a binding vote of the 
membership. Coupled with legal reforms on plant-level representation structures (rappresentanze sindicati 
unitarie), this reform ‘re-legitimized’ confederal organization and was associated with increases in membership, 
particularly in the service sector (Ponzellini and Provenzano 2001). 
The range of administrative reforms undertaken by confederations in the five countries follows similar 
trajectories. Increased use of the web and sophisticated electronic hardware and software is widespread (Greene, 
Hogan, and Grieco 2003: Kahmann 2003; Martinez Lucio 2003), as are efforts to improve the quality of service 
offered by confederations. The latter point is of particular significance in Italy and Spain as it represents a formal 
acknowledgement that members must be engaged in union activity and politics. More specifically, the TUC has 
jettisoned much of its formal standing committee structure and introduced a series of task groups, which are 
dedicated to particular campaigns and are dissolved when the campaign objectives have been achieved. 
Consistent with this accentuation of the TUC’s role in campaigning, a Communications Department was 
established to publicize campaigns initiated by the TUC (Heery 1998). In this context the TUC has successfully 
launched high-profile campaigns on organizing and partnership and has been able to cascade the objectives of 
these campaigns down to affiliated unions. The founding of the Organizing Academy to recruit and train organizers 
was a particularly important step. 
Similarly, the election of John Sweeney to the presidency of the AFL-CIO in 1995 led to wide-ranging internal 
reorganization of staff, departments, and field operations. Especially important was the creation of an organizing 
department and major expansion of the Organizing Institute. Efforts to encourage the adoption of organizing as 
a priority have also intensified. More recently, the AFL-CIO has downgraded the position of the ‘unwieldy’ fifty-
four-member Executive Council and established a seventeen- member Executive Committee in order to 
streamline confederal policy-making and to sharpen the focus of the AFL-CIO on political and organizing objectives 
(Greenhouse 2003). There is no doubt that these and similar initiatives have contributed to an impression of 
institutional vitality and may have enhanced administrative efficiency. 
However, resistance to confederal initiatives remains entrenched in both Britain and the United States. 
Furthermore, union density in the two countries continues to decline. Efforts to lead revitalization from the 
centre, thus, remain problematic in the absence of direct confederal authority over affiliated unions. In Spain, 
where confederal authority is more wide-ranging, campaigning teams have been deployed by the confederations 
to raise membership levels, particularly during works council elections (Hamann and Martinez Lucio 2003). It 
remains in question whether such an approach leads to long-term membership gains. When coupled to the 
professionalization of service delivery, this approach may also be associated with increased centralization and the 
lowering of members’ engagement in union activity (Sverke and Sjoberg 1997; Hamann and Martinez Lucio 2003). 
At the level of confederations, then, we have two promising types of structural change. In Italy and Spain where 
 confederations maintain closer control over their affiliates, confederal restructuring has the capacity to drive 
revitalization. Reductions in inter-confederal rivalries have transformative potential particularly in the political 
arena where labour has become a more credible force as a result of heightened unity (see Hamann and Kelly, 
Chapter 6, this volume). In the United Kingdom and the United States, with more decentralized traditions, the 
TUC and AFL-CIO have used structural change to increase the influence of the centre. The creation of the 
Organizing Academy, expansion of the Organizing Institute and the shift of resources to support organizing have 
helped the two confederations become pattern-setters. They are actively spreading knowledge, practical skills, 
and vision throughout the labour movement. This restructuring has clear transformative potential in countries 
with declining union density. 
Revitalization and National Union Structure 
 In each of the five countries under discussion, mergers and other forms of closer coordination are 
commonplace as a means to reform external shape among national unions. The driving force for most mergers, 
though, is membership decline and associated financial weakness (Chaison 1986; Waddington, Kahmann, and 
Hoffmann 2003). The contraction of employment in specific industries is particularly effective in promoting 
mergers when it occurs in the context of industrial unionism. Trade unions in the agriculture, mining, textile, and 
timber industries, for example, have been acquired by larger unions in many countries with the result that 
independent union organization in these industries no longer exists. Furthermore, potential economies of scale 
are too often dissipated in post-merger rationalization and early retirement schemes, which are often introduced 
to reduce the number of full-time staff in the combined organization. Thus, most mergers fit the category of 
defensive restructuring. 
Some mergers completed by larger unions, however, have the stated intent of extending organization to sectors 
of the economy where the parent union had no initial presence. To be successful such policies require both 
strategic selection of merger partners and considerable post-merger investment in recruitment and organizing. 
The Service Employees International Union’s (SEIU) merger with 1199 (National Health and Human Service 
Employees) in 1998 enabled the acquiring union to increase membership in the health sector by 25 per cent to 
500,000 (Fan 1998: 26). This augmented earlier mergers and clearly established SEIU as the dominant health care 
union in the United States, a position that was subsequently solidified by shifting substantial resources to 
organizing to secure a more wide-ranging presence. Similarly, the large newly established German service sector 
union, ver.di, resulted from a merger of five unions and displaced IG Metall as the largest union in Germany. 
In Britain, Germany, and the United States, confederations exert no direct influence on national union structure. 
Decisions on mergers and other steps to alter external shape rest almost exclusively within the national unions 
involved. In consequence, the external shape of the union movements in these countries exhibits no uniform 
pattern of development. In Britain and the United States, larger unions are tending to extend their membership 
bases both by mergers and through recruitment efforts. Although traditional jurisdictions sometimes influence 
 national union decisions regarding external boundaries, there is a consistent trend for memberships to become 
more heterogeneous. With the new membership base extending both vertically and horizontally, an increasing 
number of organizations are adopting the characteristics of general unions, with only limited industrial and 
occupational restrictions to recruitment. Although there are exceptions, in Germany, Italy, and Spain multi-
industry unions tend to result from mergers as industrial unions combine. In Germany, for example, 
Industriegewerkschaft Metall (Metal Workers’ Union) acquired the Gewerkschaft Textil-Bekliedung (Textile and 
Clothing Union) and the Gewerkschaft Holz und Kuntstoft (Wood and Plastics Union) to extend its recruitment 
base beyond its traditional base in engineering. 
Increasing membership heterogeneity is also associated with new forms of union government. Similar to 
confederal restructuring, many unions have supplemented regional and industrial forms of representation with 
structures for women, white- collar, young, and ethnic minority workers. Such measures reflect changes in 
membership composition and are intended to raise participation levels among such groups, to encourage 
horizontal interlinkages between different vertically organized groups of members, and to facilitate the 
development of union policies to incorporate items of direct concern to these groups. In short, as membership 
becomes more heterogeneous, systems of union government become more sophisticated. Arguably, union 
government also becomes more expensive in such circumstances, thus mitigating the impact of any economies of 
scale that might arise from merger involvement (Waddington, Kahmann, and Hoffmann 2003). 
It is also far from clear-cut that these measures have achieved their intended results. Take the case of women, for 
example. A variety of reserved seats systems, women’s sections and the appointment of Women’s Officers, have 
raised the profile of women trade unionists, although they tend to operate only at the senior levels within the 
union hierarchy rather than at local or regional levels. These systems have yet to result in the proportional 
representation of women in the decision-making structure of most unions at the national level (Braithwaite and 
Byrne n.d.; Garcia et al. n.d.), although women s sections have allowed more women to participate in union affairs. 
Furthermore, they have acted as additional articulating mechanisms that assist in linking the local and regional 
levels with national activities. They have, not however, elevated the status of issues of specific concern to women 
during bargaining (Cyba and Papouschek 1996; Colling and Dickens 1998). Nor have they prevented large numbers 
of women from leaving unions and citing the inadequacy of union organization as being their prime reason 
(Waddington and Kerr 1999). Many of these new approaches to union government have, thus, not yet 
transformed systems of union democracy. 
Two developments have greater potential for change: the systems of union government adopted by UNISON in 
Britain and ver.di in Germany. Both of these unions were founded by merger, and representatives of the 
participating unions set out to establish ‘new’ unions.6 Underpinning the approach adopted by UNISON and ver.di 
is the principle of proportionality, whereby the composition of each committee within the union must reflect the 
composition of the membership. In other words, if 60 per cent of a group of members are women, then 60 per 
cent of the committee that represents the group should also be women. Allied to the adoption of the principle of 
 proportionality in UNISON are novel approaches to fair representation and self-organization. The UNISON 
rulebook defines fair representation as, 
The broad balance and representation of members of the electorate, taking into account such factors as the 
balance between part-time and full-time workers, manual and non-manual workers, different occupations, skills, 
qualifications, responsibilities, race, sexuality and disability. (UNISON 1993: 65) 
Self-organization is also promoted among women members, black members, members with disabilities, and gay 
and lesbian members. In combination, these approaches by UNISON have reshaped the traditional model of trade 
union democracy (McBride 2001). Women, black and gay and lesbian members are engaged in decision-making 
processes on a wider scale than hitherto and have developed new skills appropriate to this engagement 
(Humphrey 2002). Furthermore, alliances between different self- organized groups are now likely and present 
opportunities to extend the influence already secured (Colgan and Ledwith 2000). While the situation in ver.di is 
less developed because the merger was more recent, the point is that these approaches constitute a significant 
development beyond traditional approaches to equality. 
There have also been marked shifts in the approaches of national unions to administration, with an increased 
emphasis placed on efficiency, new management techniques, and budgetary control. German and Spanish unions 
have paid particular attention to the provision of increasingly sophisticated legal services, reflecting the juridified 
industrial relations systems of the two countries (Schmidt and Trinczek 1993; Hamann and Martinez Lucio 2003). 
In addition, several German unions such as the construction workers union IG BAU, the IG Metall, and the chemical 
and mineworkers unions IG BCE have initiated comprehensive programmes for organizational development which 
seek to optimize the division of labour within the union to formalize routines, and to distribute efficiently both 
responsibilities and resources. In several cases, these programmes involved outside consultants (Behrens, Fichter, 
and Frege 2001: 15-16). 
Increased use of opinion polls and market research to obtain the views of members and non-members, coupled 
to the targeting of specific groups of potential members, is now more widespread. In Germany, for example, the 
IG Metall initiated a so-called ‘debate on the future’ (Zukunftsdebatte) which included polling weeks’ used to 
determine the views of the 120,000 workers who took part in surveys, interviews, and group discussions. In 
addition, the union commissioned nine comprehensive literature reviews on subjects related to the debate (EIRO 
2002). In some instances devolved budgetary control has been introduced in conjunction with the centralized 
setting of targets and monitoring of individual performance, which has facilitated the retention of centralized 
control within an overall tendency of shifting more resources to the local level (Waddington, Kahmann, and 
Hoffmann 2003). This tendency is most marked where bargaining is decentralized. 
There are very few examples where the introduction of administrative change has transformed union 
organization. Even where organizing budgets have been markedly increased, the absence of a clear connection 
between a union’s membership strategy and broader transformative restructuring has often undermined the 
impact of the additional funds. Two notable exceptions in the United States to this general framework are the 
 SEIU and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters (UBC). The SEIU now allocates 50 per cent of its national budget 
to organizing and requires locals to follow suit wherever possible. These initiatives, however, are also connected 
to partial revisions of union government. To move the process along, the SEIU is engineering mergers of locals it 
deems too small to pursue an effective organizing agenda independently. Although this intrusion into local union 
affairs has been questioned in some quarters within the union, support among elected leaders for the organizing 
priority has helped control opposition. Top-down structural change has been matched by an aggressive grassroots 
organizing approach, as the SEIU has continued its steady growth while other unions have struggled (Hurd, 
Milkman, and Turner 2003: 102, 111). The change effort is mission-driven under the union’s New Strength and 
Unity Programme and clearly has transformative potential. 
The UBC’s top-down restructuring has been successful in the particular sense of recruiting additional members, 
but has stirred controversy. Shortly after assuming the union’s presidency in 1995, Doug McCarron cut national 
office staff by half, eliminated departments, and rented out nine and one-half floors of the ten storey national 
headquarters to generate revenues. These changes helped fund a shift of 50 per cent of the union’s resources 
into organizing. Subsequently, McCarron reorganized the union’s regional and local structure, eliminating many 
locals and shifting control of resources to regional councils dominated by his political allies (Cleeland 2002). These 
aggressive changes have allowed the UBC to expand its organizing programme dramatically. Membership 
increased from about 500,000 in 1996 to 538,000 in 2002 (Gifford 1997: 50, 2003: 42). Although there are 
transformative elements to the UBC restructuring in terms of labour movement revitalization, there have been 
destructive components as well. On 29 March 2001 the UBC seceded from the AFL-CIO, ostensibly because the 
Sweeney administration compromised its commitment to organizing (Cleeland 2002). 
The most promising restructuring at the national union level is tied to internal modifications. Although formed by 
mergers, the transformative aspects of the operation of UNISON in the United Kingdom and ver.di in Germany 
are the governance systems created by the new organizations with provisions to increase the role of women, 
minorities and young union members. In the United States, both the SEIU and UBC have restructured 
administration and governance to elevate dramatically the importance of organizing initiatives. 
Pan-European Level 
 The development of the ETUC and the EIFs is closely linked to the successive enlargements of the 
European Union and to the process of European integration. From the perspective of external shape, both the 
ETUC and the EIFs have thus repeatedly extended their coverage to embrace successive enlargements. This 
happened with the affiliation of the communist-oriented confederations, and most recently the accession of 
confederations from Central and Eastern Europe. With the affiliation of the Confederation Generale du Travail 
(CGT) in 1999, the coverage of the ETUC was almost complete in Western Europe. Only some small confederations 
of civil servants and professional and managerial workers are now outside. Over 60 million trade union members 
from more than thirty countries are affiliated to the ETUC through confederations and national unions. 
 While this pattern of development has markedly extended the external shape of the ETUC, it has merely allowed 
the coverage of the ETUC to match that of the European Union. In other words, to retain influence in the European 
Union the ETUC was obliged to extend coverage. Internal democracy remains embedded in an ‘intergovernmental’ 
system based on nationality and membership size. Recent reviews of this system, under the chair of Johan 
Stecklenburg (1990) and John Monks respectively, have not recommended fundamental changes to the operation 
of this system. The 4-yearly congress7 remains the supreme decision-making body, while an Executive and a 
relatively small secretariat are responsible for administering the organization between congresses. 
Concurrent with the Stecklenburg review was a series of important developments within the European Union. 
The most prominent among these were preparations for the single market, an Intergovernmental Conference on 
treaty reform, negotiations on a framework to institutionalize the role of the social partners, and preparations for 
economic and monetary union. In combination these developments prompted two structural reforms of the ETUC 
of transformative potential. 
The first of these concerned the assignment of wider bargaining powers to the ETUC by affiliated confederations 
at the ETUC Congress in, 1991. The extent of the bargaining powers granted to the ETUC were not as wide-ranging 
as initially envisaged by those that proposed the motion, due largely to opposition from Nordic confederations 
(Dolvik 1999: 132-40). The granting of any authority to the ETUC to enable it to bargain independently, however, 
represented a fundamental transformation to its political influence. The subsequent engagement of the ETUC in 
negotiations on a range of issues including European works councils, parental leave, part-time workers, and fixed-
term contracts of employment, together with its involvement in broader matters of social dialogue, illustrate the 
impact of the initial decision to grant it bargaining rights. Although the direction of ETUC policy is contested 
(Waddington 2000), movement towards a European industrial relations area required an ETUC with the authority 
to bargain, a development of transformative potential. 
A second reform of the ETUC adopted in 1991 arose from a recommendation of the Stecklenburg Report. The 
constitution of the ETUC initially allowed only national level confederations to affiliate directly. In 1991 this was 
amended to enable EIFs to affiliate directly to the ETUC, and to grant seats to representatives of the EIFs on the 
Executive of the ETUC. In practice, this decision meant that national unions were linked to the ETUC through two 
routes; geographically via a national confederation and sectorally via the EIFs. The adoption of this measure, thus, 
represented the abandonment of country of origin as the sole basis to organization. 
The amendment also has the long-term potential to be transformative in the context of bargaining power. 
Throughout Europe a range of cross-border bargaining initiatives were developed after about 1995, most of which 
were sector-specific and fostered by unions affiliated to particular EIFs (Gollbach and Schulten 2000; Prince 1995). 
Furthermore, in 1999 the ETUC Congress resolved to strive for ‘the paramount goal’ of a coordinated collective 
bargaining policy ‘developed at sectoral or cross- sectoral level’ with ‘primary responsibility for coordination in 
the field of collective bargaining at European level’ allocated to the EIFs (ETUC 1999: 67). There are many 
 difficulties to overcome before European sectoral bargaining becomes a reality, not the least of which is the 
absence of employers’ organizations prepared to enter into bargaining arrangements. Designating the principal 
role in this function to the EIFs, however, represents the potential to diminish further the influence of the national 
confederations and to transform the ETUC into a European confederation of EIFs, each of which conducts 
bargaining. 
The institutional vitality of trade union organizations at the pan-European level is thus associated with the 
developing polity of the European Union. The development of a bargaining function by the ETUC and marked 
shifts in the position of the EIFs represent changes of transformative potential. Other reforms of the EIFs are more 
defensive in character. The reduction in the number of EIFs after 1996 as a result of mergers, for example, results 
primarily from membership decline and financial weaknesses.8 Furthermore, there is little or no correspondence 
between these mergers and the structural reform of national unions, thus minimizing any benefits that might 
arise from economies of scale. The limited resources available to the EIFs also limit the transformative capacity of 
all of these developments. National level union organizations are the primary source of these resources. 
Membership decline, and associated financial difficulties at the national level effectively restricts the allocation of 
additional resources to the pan-European level. 
In sum, restructuring at the pan-European level has great transformative potential. The wider role established by 
the ETUC within the European Union has substantially increased labour’s political influence. Furthermore, the 
direct affiliation of the EIFs with the ETUC has opened the window of opportunity for European level bargaining 
and wider sectoral integration. 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
TO UNION REVITALIZATION 
 Restructuring has been integral to revitalization initiatives in all five of the countries we have studied and 
at the pan-European level. National unions have pursued mergers and introduced internal reforms in governance 
and administration with the clear intent to achieve transformative results. Confederations have restructured to 
demonstrate new priorities and to lead renewal efforts. The ETUC working with EIFs has been actively involved in 
shaping labour’s role in the emerging integration of the European economy. Our review shows that there are 
indeed incidents of structural change that meet the standard of ‘transformative’ restructuring, or at least have 
transformative potential. During a time of upheaval in labour relations systems, only transformative restructuring 
with its embedded strategic perspective can contribute to labour movement revitalization. Because union 
external shapes were established when different social, political, and economic circumstances prevailed, it is 
necessary to reform trade union structures to eliminate outdated demarcations. Furthermore, internal reform of 
systems of union government and administration provides the opportunity to by-pass conservative vested 
interests and introduce new systems appropriate for the changed environment. While possibly an insufficient 
basis for union revitalization in its own right, transformative restructuring will almost certainly play a key role in 
 labour movement renewal. But have the restructuring efforts as described been successful? Has the 
transformative intent translated into actual revitalization? In order to interpret further the impact of restructuring 
it is useful to return to the four dimensions of labour movement revitalization introduced in Chapter 2. 
Within the membership dimension restructuring at both the confederation and national union levels has the 
capacity to shift resources to organizing, and also to achieve economies of scale which may free resources for 
intensified recruitment campaigns. Thus, mergers are frequently justified to enlarge membership numbers and to 
overcome competition in organizing members between unions with overlapping jurisdictions. However, although 
strategically driven mergers and targeted creation of subsidiaries may facilitate national union organization in 
new arenas, or may intensify organizing in markets where the union is already established, this type of result 
seldom accompanies the widespread effort to consolidate unions in the countries we have studied (see Heery and 
Adler, Chapter 4, this volume). In addition, restructuring can be used to enhance organizing strategies. The TUC 
and the AFL-CIO have taken the lead in establishing organizing as a priority in the United Kingdom and the United 
States, shifting resources and creating new units to achieve this result. Individual unions in the United States, 
especially SEIU and UBC have gone even further by reorienting the respective unions to recruitment activity. 
Restructuring also can affect the economic dimension of revitalization, in three ways. First, by improving 
administration, unions gain resources and organizational flexibility. Second, restructuring may enable unions to 
establish more effective ways to process information on the outcomes of bargaining and other union activities, 
and use the information to mobilize members and resources more effectively. Third, by changing external 
structure unions can reform the bargaining framework and level to ‘fit’ changing labour markets and company 
organizational structure. Unfortunately, the evidence we have reviewed does not indicate great progress along 
the economic dimension. Increased coordination among confederations in Spain and Italy has, however, 
contributed at least modestly to increased leverage. Perhaps the greatest potential exists at the pan-European 
level where the EIFs offer the opportunity to deal more effectively with multinational corporations. 
Structural change can have an effect on the political dimension of revitalization in two respects. First, by changing 
their external structure unions can pool their resources vis-ä-vis political power holders and gain leverage in the 
field of political lobbying or corporatist arrangements. In this regard, increased collaboration in Italy and Spain 
has improved the political influence of confederations. Similarly, increased support for the ETUC that 
accompanied direct affiliation by the EIFs enhanced political influence within the European Union. Second, 
improvements in the field of union government provide labour’s political allies with an opportunity to benefit 
from their legitimacy. In spite of some evidence of positive change in this aspect of internal operation, there is 
little evidence of associated increase in political influence. 
The potential power of structural change is strongest in the institutional dimension, which was defined as a 
composite of unions’ institutional shape, identities and dynamics. Although structural change clearly alters the 
shape of union institutions, this alone is not sufficient to assure progress towards revitalization. In contrast to the 
 old institutionalists’, many of whom were inspired by Robert Michels and the iron law of oligarchy (1989), the 
potential power of restructuring is viewed here as infusing a commitment to dynamic change into the union. In 
other words, if structural change helps labour overcome strategic rigidity and accept innovation, then there is 
clearly progress in this dimension. The restructuring that has occurred in the United States and the United 
Kingdom to promote organizing, or in some German unions to promote more democratic and efficient 
organizations, has certainly contributed to institutional vitality. Similarly, the confederal reforms in Italy and Spain 
have strengthened coordination and injected new life into those labour movements. Also, the increased visibility 
and role of the ETUC has helped to infuse dynamic change into that organization. 
In spite of these encouraging signs at various levels of the labour movements in and across these countries, we 
must conclude that structural change in itself does not hold great potential to drive revitalization. Restructuring, 
clearly, has enhanced institutional vitality at all levels in a variety of ways. However, this is not enough. Without 
more substantial progress in the membership, economic, and political dimensions, this institutional progress will 
have little substantive impact. Moreover, it is only in conjunction with other strategic approaches that 
restructuring becomes important. In fact, it is in the context of new organizing, political and bargaining strategies, 
and the emergence of new international initiatives that structural change takes on the crucial role of 
institutionalizing labour movement revitalization. 
Notes 
1. In practice, European Industry Federations may be independent organizations, that attract members from 
within the European Union and a broader Europe, or they may be regional organizations of International Trade 
Secretariats. As this distinction does not have significance in the context of union revitalization, its implications 
are not examined in detail here. 
2. In Spain, there are also confederations based on specific regions. These confederations are excluded from this 
analysis. 
3. We classify Germany as a unitary system, although it should be noted that there are some small pockets of 
inter-union rivalry where the DGB’s affiliates are facing competition from independent unions or union 
federations. The Christian Trade Union Federation of Germany (Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund, CGB), as the most 
important of those competing federations, represents about 300,000 employees in several industries. In addition, 
some rival unions such as the pilots’ union Cockpit or the Independent Association of Flight Attendants 
(Unabhängige Flugbegleiter Organization, UFO) were created in opposition to the DGB and its affiliates. 
4. Affiliations to the TUC since 1995 include Professional Footballers’ Association, Community and Youth Workers’ 
Association, Community and District Nursing Association, UNIFI, Independent Union of Halifax Staff, Society of 
Chiropodists and Podiatrists, British Dietetic Association, Association of Flight Attendants-Heathrow Local, 
Association of Teachers and Lecturers, Alliance and Leicester Group Union of Staff, Association of Educational 
Psychologists, Nationwide Group Staff Union, Woolwich Independent Staff Union, and the Britannic Field Staff 
 Association. 
5. As noted above the TUC was also active in attracting new affiliates in the same period. The extent of the decline 
among the population of affiliated unions of 1990 is thus understated by these figures. 
6. UNISON was formed in 1993 by the merger of the Confederation of Health Service Employees, National and 
Local Government Officers’ Association, and the National Union of Public Employees. Ver.di was formed by merger 
in 2001 from Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft, Deutsche Postgewerkschaft, Gewerkschaft Handel, Banken 
und Versicherungen, Industriegewerkschaft Medien and Gewerkschaft Öffentliche Dienste, Transport und 
Verkehr. Both unions organize service workers: UNISON in just the public services, whereas ver.di organizes across 
all services. Furthermore, the two unions are the largest unions in their respective countries (for details, see 
Waddington et al. 2003). 
7. Before 1991 the ETUC congress was held every third year and every fourth year thereafter. 
8. Several mergers involving EIFs took place from the mid-1990s. Among these mergers were the formation of 
the European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers’ Federation from the European Federation of Chemical 
Workers’ Unions and the Miners’ European Federation, and the acquisition of the European Federation of 
Agricultural Workers’ Unions by the European Committee of Food, Catering, and Allied Workers’ Unions. In 
addition, the international trade secretariats of the International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, Professional, 
and Technical Employees, Communications International and the International Graphical, Media and 
Entertainment Federation merged to form Union Network International (UNI). This merger was also carried 
through at European level where the respective European regional organization merged to form UNI-Europa. 
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